

COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOUR AND DIVERSITY IN ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES: SOME INSIGHTS FROM AN EVOLUTIONARY GAME

VIVEK S. BORKAR

*Department of Computer Science and Automation
Indian Institute of Science
Bangalore 560 012, India*

SANJAY JAIN

*Centre for Theoretical Studies
Indian Institute of Science
Bangalore 560 012, India*

AND

GOVINDAN RANGARAJAN

*Department of Mathematics and Centre for Theoretical Studies
Indian Institute of Science
Bangalore 560 012, India*

Abstract. Many complex adaptive systems contain a large diversity of specialized components. The specialization at the level of the microscopic degrees of freedom, and diversity at the level of the system as a whole are phenomena that appear during the course of evolution of the system. We present a mathematical model to describe these evolutionary phenomena in economic communities. The model is a generalization of the replicator equation. The economic motivation for the model and its relationship with some other game theoretic models applied to ecology and sociobiology is discussed. Some results about the attractors of this dynamical system are described. We argue that while the microscopic variables – the agents comprising the community – act locally and independently, time evolution produces a collective behaviour in the system characterized by individual specialization of the agents as well as global diversity in the community. This occurs for generic values of the parameters and initial conditions provided the community is sufficiently large, and can be viewed as a kind of self-organization in the system. The context dependence of acceptable innovations in the community appears naturally in this framework.

1. Introduction

Several complex adaptive systems in the course of their evolution exhibit the phenomenon that the individual components comprising the system evolve to perform highly specialized tasks whereas the system as a whole evolves towards greater diversity in terms of the kinds of components it contains or the tasks that are performed in it. Here are some examples:

1. Living systems are made of cells, which in turn are made of molecules. Among the various types of molecules are the proteins. Each type of protein molecule has evolved to perform a very specific task, e.g., catalyse a specific reaction in the cell. At the same time, during the course of evolution, diverse kinds of protein molecules have appeared – the range of specialized tasks being performed by protein molecules has increased.
2. In an ecology, species with highly specialized traits appear (e.g., butterflies with a specific pattern of spots on their wings). Simultaneously, the ecology evolves to support a diverse variety of specialized species.
3. Many early human societies (such as hunter-gatherer societies) were perhaps characterized by the fact that there were relatively few chores (e.g., hunting, gathering, defending, raising shelter) to be performed, and everyone in the community performed almost all the chores. These societies evolved to have specialist hunters, tool makers, farmers, carpenters, etc. Individuals specialized, and simultaneously a diverse set of specialists appeared.
4. In an economic web, we find firms exploring and occupying increasingly specialized niches, while the web as a whole supports an increasingly diverse set of specialists.

In the examples above the systems and their underlying dynamics are quite different. But they all share the twin evolutionary phenomena of individual specialization and global diversification. In all these systems, the nonlinear interaction among the components seems to play a crucial role in the manifestation of this type of behaviour. For example, in an ecology, the development of highly specialized traits in a species is a result of its interaction with and feedback from other species. In an economic community, each agent's choices depend upon feedback from exchanges (of goods, money, etc.) with other agents. Moreover, there is no purposeful global organizing agency which directs the behaviour of individual components and ordains them to be specialists. The phenomenon happens 'spontaneously', arising from the local moves made at the level of individual components. Similarly diversity also arises as individuals capitalize on innovations – mutations, technological innovations, etc. – which suit them in the existing context.

In this article, we describe a mathematical model which seems to exhibit the above twin evolutionary phenomena. The (idealized) behaviour of agents in economic communities provides the basic motivation of the model. The model consists of a set of coupled nonlinear ordinary differential equations describing the time evolution of the activities of individual agents. In the next section we motivate and present the model and place it in the perspective of existing work. In section 3 we define more precisely the notions of specialization and diversity in the context of the model and outline what type of behaviour we are looking for. Essentially we

are seeking attractors of the dynamical model that have the property of individual specialization and global diversity. Section 4 states certain theorems and numerical results for the attractors of the system and discusses their consequences. The results imply that under certain conditions that do not destroy genericity in parameter space, the desired attractors (in which the system exhibits individual specialization and global diversity) exist and have basins of attraction that cover the entire configuration space. Thus the evolutionary phenomena mentioned above occur generically in the model. In this section we also discuss self-organization and the emergence of innovations in the model. Finally, section 5 contains a brief summary.

2. The model

The system is a community of N agents labeled by the index $\alpha = 1, 2, \dots, N$. Each agent can perform s strategies or activities labelled by $i \in S = \{1, 2, \dots, s\}$. At time t , agent α performs strategy i with a probability $p_i^\alpha(t)$, $\sum_{i=1}^s p_i^\alpha(t) = 1$. The vector $\mathbf{p}^\alpha(t) = (p_1^\alpha(t), p_2^\alpha(t), \dots, p_s^\alpha(t))$ is the mixed strategy profile of agent α at time t . In particular, if $p_i^\alpha(t) = \delta_{ij}$, then the agent α is said to pursue the pure strategy j or to have specialized in strategy j .

The vectors $\mathbf{p}^\alpha(t)$ constitute the basic dynamical variables of the model. The equation governing their evolution is taken to be

$$\dot{p}_i^\alpha(t) = p_i^\alpha(t) \left[\sum_{\beta \neq \alpha} \sum_{j=1}^s a_{ij} p_j^\beta(t) - \sum_{\beta \neq \alpha} \sum_{i,j=1}^s p_i^\alpha(t) a_{ij} p_j^\beta(t) \right]. \quad (1)$$

Here a_{ij} denotes the ij th element of the s -dimensional payoff matrix A .

This dynamics is motivated as follows. Each agent is interacting pairwise with all other agents and receiving a payoff at every interaction that depends on the strategy pursued by each of the agents during that interaction. Each agent updates her strategy profile based on the payoffs received, so as to increase her payoff at subsequent interactions. In a time Δt , agent α has a total of $m\Delta t$ interactions with every agent (m assumed constant). If in a particular interaction with agent β , agent α plays pure strategy k and β plays pure strategy j , then the payoff to α is a_{kj} (by the definition of payoff matrix elements). Since α plays the strategy k with probability p_k^α and β plays the strategy j with probability p_j^β , the average payoff to α from the $m\Delta t$ interactions with β is

$$m\Delta t \sum_{k,j} p_k^\alpha(t) a_{kj} p_j^\beta(t).$$

The average payoff to α from the whole community is

$$m\Delta t \sum_{\beta \neq \alpha} \sum_{k,j} p_k^\alpha(t) a_{kj} p_j^\beta(t).$$

This is the second term in the [] in Eq. (1). We have assumed that Δt is large enough for there to be a statistically sufficient number of interactions $m\Delta t$ so that averages make sense. Yet it is small enough compared to the time scale at which agents update their strategies so that p_k^α can be considered constant during Δt , i.e.,

there is a separation of time scales between the individual interactions of agents (which happen on a short time scale) and the time scale over which agents update their strategy profile (a long time scale).

If agent α were to pursue not the mixed strategy profile \mathbf{p}^α during this interval but instead the pure strategy i , then the payoff received during this period would have been

$$m\Delta t \sum_{\beta \neq \alpha} \sum_j a_{ij} p_j^\beta(t).$$

This is the first term in the [] in Eq. (1). This quantity depends on i and for some i will be greater than the average payoff and for some it will be less than the average payoff. At the end of period Δt , the agent α updates her strategy profile p_i^α to $p_i^\alpha + \Delta p_i^\alpha$, adding a positive weight Δp_i^α to those strategies i that do better than the average and a negative weight to those doing worse than the average. $\Delta p_i^\alpha / p_i^\alpha$ is chosen to be proportional to the amount by which the pure strategy payoff differs from the average payoff:

$$\frac{\Delta p_i^\alpha}{p_i^\alpha} = cm\Delta t \left[\sum_{\beta \neq \alpha} \sum_j a_{ij} p_j^\beta(t) - \sum_{\beta \neq \alpha} \sum_{i,j} p_i^\alpha(t) a_{ij} p_j^\beta(t) \right]. \quad (2)$$

Taking the limit $\Delta t \rightarrow 0$ and rescaling t by the factor cm , we recover Eq. (1). Therefore the equation embodies the statement that at all times, all agents update their individual mixed strategy profiles so as to increase their own payoffs in the current environment of the strategy profiles of other agents.

The reason why $\Delta p_i^\alpha / p_i^\alpha$ and not just Δp_i^α appears in the l.h.s. of (2) is that the dynamics must respect the probability interpretation of p_i^α . If two pure strategies i and i' provide the same payoff to agent α , she must increment them in proportion to their current strength in her profile. This is needed to ensure that $\mathbf{p}^\alpha(t)$ remains normalized at all times, $\sum_{i=1}^s p_i^\alpha(t) = 1$. If we start with normalized \mathbf{p}^α , the proportionality factor p_i^α on the r.h.s of (1) ensures that it remains normalized, since $\sum_{i=1}^s \dot{p}_i^\alpha(t) = 0$.

Thus, we have a community of N interacting agents, each responding to the rest of the environment by updating their own profile according to the above dynamical equation. This is a “non-cooperative game”. Agents act on their own (not in concert, *per se*) and are selfish – their actions are designed to increase their own payoff, without consideration for others or the community as a whole. Agents also exhibit “bounded rationality” – they do not anticipate other agents’ future strategies, but merely respond to the aggregate of the other agents’ current strategies. There is no global organizing agency at work, the community evolves just through these individual actions of the agents.

Nevertheless, we will argue that the community does exhibit a kind of global organization under certain circumstances. If the community starts with some arbitrary initial condition in which each \mathbf{p}^α at $t = 0$ is specified (each agent starts with some mixed strategy profile which could be different for different agents) and evolves according to Eq. (1), it will settle down to some attractor of the dynamics. The organization referred to above is in the nature of the attractors. When the payoff matrix elements satisfy certain inequalities, and when the size of the community is larger than a certain finite bound that depends on the payoff matrix (i.e., N is sufficiently

large), then we find that these attractors are characterized by each individual agent having specialized to some pure strategy or the other, and at the same time the community as a whole retaining its full diversity of strategies, i.e., every pure strategy is pursued by some agent or the other in the attractor configuration. Such attractors seem, generically, to be the only stable attractors of the system under the above conditions. Most of the time, we will consider the system with a fixed set of pure strategies. At the end, we will mention applications of our results for the innovation of new strategies. The instability of attractors in which the community does not have the full diversity of available strategies provides a mechanism by which new pure strategies, or innovations, can invade the system.

Before proceeding further, we would like to place this model in the perspective of existing work in the subject. Consider the “homogeneous sector”, where all agents have the same (but in general mixed) strategy profile: $p^\alpha = x \forall \alpha$. Then Eq. (1) reduces to

$$\dot{x}_i(t) = x_i(t) \left[\sum_j a_{ij} x_j(t) - \sum_{k,j} x_k(t) a_{kj} x_j(t) \right] (N-1). \quad (3)$$

The overall factor of $N-1$ can be absorbed in a rescaling of time. This equation is the well known replicator equation [1]. It has applications in diverse fields such as economics and sociobiology (where it models evolutionary games) macromolecular evolution (describing evolution of autocatalytic networks, in particular the hypercyclic feedback), mathematical ecology (Eq. (3) maps onto the Lotka-Volterra equation) and population genetics (where it is the continuous counterpart of the discrete selection equation). This system exhibits a great diversity of solutions including fixed points, limit cycles, heteroclinic cycles, etc. For more details, see [2]. In these applications i labels strategies or species of molecules or organisms, depending upon the application. x_i represents the fraction of individuals of type i in a large population, and Eq. (3) models the change of the composition of the *population* with time.

Eq. (1) has been considered as a multi-population generalization of the replicator dynamics and has been studied as such in the literature [2] [3]. The index α now labels populations, e.g., $\alpha = 1$ might correspond to a population of frogs, and $\alpha = 2$ to a population of insects. The idea here is to model the co-evolution of the populations of frogs and insects in interaction with each other. p_i^1 now stands for the fraction of the frog population with genotype i and p_j^2 for the fraction of the insect population with genotype j . The indices i and j run over values s_1 and s_2 respectively which need not be equal, and now there are two payoff matrices, one for the frogs, $A^1 = (a_{ij}^1)$, whose matrix element a_{ij}^1 equals the payoff to a frog of type i in an encounter with an insect of type j , and another for the insects, $A^2 = (a_{ji}^2)$ whose matrix element a_{ji}^2 equals the payoff to the insect in the same encounter. The dynamics for the two populations is now given by

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{p}_i^1(t) &= p_i^1(t) \left[\sum_{j=1}^{s_2} a_{ij}^1 p_j^2(t) - \sum_{k=1}^{s_1} \sum_{j=1}^{s_2} p_k^1(t) a_{kj}^2 p_j^2(t) \right], \\ \dot{p}_j^2(t) &= p_j^2(t) \left[\sum_{i=1}^{s_1} a_{ji}^2 p_i^1(t) - \sum_{k=1}^{s_2} \sum_{i=1}^{s_1} p_k^2(t) a_{ki}^1 p_i^1(t) \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

This is a so called ‘bimatrix game’ and reduces to Eq. (1) with $N = 2$, when $s_1 = s_2 = s$ and $A_1 = A_2 = A$.

Our interpretation of Eq. (1), presented earlier, is different from the “multipopulation” interpretation. The index α labels individuals and not populations. In the multipopulation interpretation, individuals in each population are hard-wired to be of some specific genotype, while the composition of the population is plastic and subject to selection. For us, the composition of the mixed strategy profile of each individual is subject to selection. In the multipopulation interpretation there is no reason for A^1 and A^2 to be equal; frogs and insects *are* quite different. However a single payoff matrix A is natural in the present context if the community consists of N *identical* agents (identical in that the payoffs to agents in any interaction depends on the strategies played in that interaction and not on the identity of the agents). This allows us to study large communities (large N) without the simultaneous proliferation of parameters. To our knowledge, the interpretation of Eq. (1) as modelling not N populations but a single community of N identical individuals is new. While we make use of existing mathematical results for Eq. (1), the new interpretation prompts us to investigate certain other mathematical properties of the model which have not received attention. Since Eq. (1) is a generalization of the replicator dynamics, we will refer to it as the generalized replicator dynamics (GRD) whereas Eq. (3) will be referred to as pure replicator dynamics (PRD).

Note that in (4) frogs receive payoffs only from insects, not from other frogs, and insects only from frogs, not from other insects. This is because the competition among the different genotypes of frogs happens not directly, but indirectly via their interactions and competition with insects: the more successful genotypes among frogs might be the ones (depending upon the payoff matrix) which do better at capturing insects. Similarly insects do not compete with each other directly but only with frogs; the insect population profile evolves because some insect genotypes do better than others at, say, evading frogs. A similar justification might be provided for agents in the present context. A single isolated agent has no competition and hence no motivation to change her strategy profile. There is no direct competition among the weights of different pure strategies within the strategy profile of a single agent; this competition and consequent evolution arises indirectly because of the external pressure on the agent from the other agents. A firm that produces a number of goods in the economy need not change its production profile if there are no other producers. But if other producers enter the fray, the firm may need to change (say, specialize in the production of a few items), in order to compete effectively. This feature is captured in the model by the exclusion of the $\beta = \alpha$ term on the r.h.s. of (1) – agents don’t compete with themselves but with other agents. We will see later that this property is important for the emergence of specialization in the model.

A well known example is the “Hawk-dove game” [4], in which there are two pure strategies, “hawk” ($i = 1$) and “dove” ($i = 2$). The payoff matrix elements are $a_{11} = (g - c)/2$, $a_{12} = g$, $a_{21} = 0$, and $a_{22} = g/2$, with (typically) $c > g > 0$. In this game individuals interact pairwise and every interaction is a competition for some resource. In an interaction, a hawk always escalates and fights, irrespective of what the opponent does. A dove “displays”, but retreats if the opponent escalates. Thus when hawk meets dove, the dove always retreats and gets zero payoff, while the hawk

gains a payoff g from the resource. When dove meets dove, both have equal chance of getting the resource or retreating, hence the average payoff to each party in such an encounter is $g/2$. When hawk meets hawk, there is a fight, and with equal probability one wins without injury and gains g , while the other retreats with an injury resulting in a cost c . The average payoff in hawk-hawk encounters to each party is therefore $(g - c)/2$. It is instructive to contrast the treatment of this game in PRD and GRD. In the former, there is a large population of individuals, each hardwired to be pure hawk or pure dove in every encounter. The fraction of the population that is hawk, x_1 , and the fraction that is dove, $x_2 = 1 - x_1$, evolves according to (3) in response to selection pressure and birth/death processes. The point $(x_1, x_2) = (g, c - g)/c$ is a stable equilibrium of (3), and generically, the population ends up in this attractor, i.e., with a ratio of hawks to doves being $g/(g - c)$. In GRD, one would have N agents, each allowed to play both hawk and dove strategy in an encounter with the respective probabilities p_1^α and p_2^α . It is not obvious that each agent will end up specializing in a pure hawk or pure dove strategy, but that is what does happen. A consequence of one of the theorems to be described later is that the only stable attractor of this GRD is a configuration where agents tend to distribute themselves in a pure hawk or pure dove strategy roughly in the ratio $g/(c - g)$ for finite N , and exactly in this ratio as $N \rightarrow \infty$. Thus individual specialization, which was true by assumption in PRD, is a dynamical outcome in GRD. Moreover, while individuals specialize in their self interest to some pure strategy or the other depending upon their initial conditions, collectively the community seems to obey some global constraints.

3. Definitions and Notation

Consider

$$J = \{\mathbf{x} = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_s) \in R^s \mid \sum_{i=1}^s x_i = 1, x_i \geq 0\},$$

which is the simplex of s -dimensional probability vectors. J is the full configuration space of PRD dynamics and is invariant under it. The configuration space for GRD is J^N , the N -fold product. A generic point of J^N is $p = (\mathbf{p}^1, \mathbf{p}^2, \dots, \mathbf{p}^N)$, each \mathbf{p}^α being an s -dimensional probability vector $\mathbf{p}^\alpha(t) = (p_1^\alpha(t), p_2^\alpha(t), \dots, p_s^\alpha(t))$ belonging to $J^{(\alpha)}$ (the latter being a copy of the simplex J corresponding to agent α).

A point $\mathbf{x} \in J$ such that $x_i = \delta_{ij}$ for some j is called the j th corner of J . If an agent α has specialized to the pure strategy j , then $p_i^\alpha = \delta_{ij}$, i.e., \mathbf{p}^α has gone to the j th corner of $J^{(\alpha)}$. If every agent has specialized to some strategy or the other, the corresponding point in J^N will be called a *corner* of J^N and we say that the community is *fully specialized*. Note that every corner of J^N is an equilibrium point of GRD, since the r.h.s. of (1) vanishes. Hence we refer to corners as corner equilibrium points (CEPs).

A CEP can be characterized by an s -vector of non-negative integers $\mathbf{n} = (n_1, n_2, \dots, n_s)$ where n_i denotes the number of agents pursuing the pure strategy i at CEP. There can be many CEPs with the same \mathbf{n} vector. These would differ only in the identity of the agents at various corners. In this article we will ignore the differences between such corners and characterize a CEP by its \mathbf{n} -vector alone, since the agents are identical and differ only in their strategy profile.

Consider the following subset of J^N : $F_k \equiv \{p \in J^N | p_k^\alpha = 0 \forall \alpha\}$ for some fixed $k \in S$. By definition, at a point in F_k , every agent has opted out of strategy k . F_k is also invariant under (1), i.e., if p_k^α is zero at some time, it remains zero. At the “face” F_k , strategy k therefore becomes extinct from the population, and we say that the full diversity of strategies is lost. As long as the system is not in some F_k , we say that the community exhibits the “*full diversity*” of strategies. Note that the word ‘diversity’, as used here, does not stand for variability among agents, but to indicate that all strategies are supported. For example we can have no variation but full diversity at points p where $\mathbf{p}^\alpha = \mathbf{c} \forall \alpha$ and none of the components of \mathbf{c} are zero. This is a “homogeneous” point, since all agents are doing the same thing.

If a CEP is such that $n_i \neq 0$ for all i , i.e., each strategy is played by at least one agent at the CEP, we will refer to it as a *fully diversified* CEP or FDCEP. If one or more n_i is zero, the full diversity of strategies is lost and such CEPs are called non-FDCEPs.

We are interested in studying the circumstances under which FDCEPs are the preferred attractors of the dynamics, for then, individual specialization and global diversity will arise dynamically in the community. If it happens that the FDCEPs are attractors and their basins of attraction cover most of J^N (all of J^N except a set of lower dimension), then for generic initial conditions the community is bound to end up in an FDCEP, which means that it will exhibit individual specialization and as well as global diversity.

4. Results

In this section we discuss some results concerning attractors of GRD. The proofs of the theorems are omitted here; these and further results can be found in [5, 6]. We will discuss the significance of these results for specialization and diversity in GRD.

4.1. INTERIOR EQUILIBRIUM POINTS

An equilibrium point of GRD is called an interior equilibrium point (IEP) if none of the p_i^α is zero. We have the following theorem:

Theorem 1: There is at most one isolated IEP. If there is one, it is homogeneous and is given by $p_i^\alpha = x_i \forall \alpha, i$ where $x_i \equiv u_i / \det B$, u_i is the cofactor of B_{0i} , and B is the $(s+1) \times (s+1)$ matrix (whose rows and columns are labelled by the indices $0, 1, 2, \dots, s$)

$$B \equiv \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 & 1 & \cdots & 1 \\ -1 & & & & \\ -1 & & A & & \\ \vdots & & & & \\ -1 & & & & \end{pmatrix}. \quad (5)$$

A necessary and sufficient condition for an isolated IEP to exist is given by

A1: $u_i \neq 0 \forall i$, and all u_i have the same sign.

PRD also has an isolated IEP if condition **A1** holds, which is then unique and given by the same x_i as given above for GRD. Further, note that at the IEP in GRD, the system exhibits full diversity since no strategy is opted out of by any agent.

However, there is no specialization. The above formula for the IEP in particular yields the point $(x_1, x_2) = (g, c - g)/c$ for the hawk-dove game.

4.2. SPECIALIZATION

For generic payoff matrices A , generic initial conditions, and sufficiently large N , we find that the system flows into a corner of J^N . Thus specialization is a generic outcome of the dynamics. This observation is based on the following facts:

1. **Theorem 2:** [2, 3] Any compact set in the interior of J^N or the relative interior of any face cannot be asymptotically stable. An equilibrium point is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict Nash equilibrium. (A strict Nash equilibrium is a point p such that at this point if any single agent unilaterally changes her strategy – unilaterally means that all other agents remain where they are – then her payoff strictly decreases.)
2. **Theorem 3:** Every asymptotically stable attractor must contain at least one corner equilibrium.
3. **Numerical Work:** The GRD equation for $s = 3$ was numerically integrated using Runge-Kutta method of fourth order. We randomly generated ten 3×3 payoff matrices and numerically integrated the GRD equations for long times for each payoff matrix with ten randomly chosen initial conditions. When this was done with $N = 5$, in 90 out of the 100 cases the dynamics converged to a corner. The remaining 10 cases (all corresponding to a single payoff matrix) converged to a heteroclinic cycle. (In these 10 cases the system cycled between regions close to a few corners, moving rapidly between these regions, and at every successive cycle spending increasing amounts of time near the corners and coming closer to them.) When N was increased to 10 for the same ten payoff matrices studied above, all 100 cases converged to a corner. This suggests that the typically, the stable attractors are corners or heteroclinic cycles, with corners becoming overwhelmingly more likely at larger N .

Why are corners the preferred attractors of this dynamics? We give here an intuitive argument, which, though not rigorous or complete, provides some insight. (For rigorous arguments, refer to the proofs of the above mentioned theorems.) Recall that according to the dynamics each agent updates her strategy profile to increase her payoff in the current environment. Pick an agent α . Her payoff at any point is $P^\alpha = \sum_k p_k^\alpha c_k^\alpha$ where $c_k^\alpha \equiv \sum_{\beta \neq \alpha} a_{k\beta} p_j^\beta$. Given a set of s numbers c_k^α for a fixed α , generically one of them will be the largest. Let the largest one be c_l^α (for some particular l). Then it is clear that since the payoff P^α is linear in p_k^α , the choice $p_k^\alpha = \delta_{kl}$ will maximize it. Thus, as long as the index of the largest of the c_k^α remains $k = l$, the agent α will move towards the pure strategy l . This argument can be made for any agent. Thus every agent is, at any time, moving towards some pure strategy. In this argument it is crucial that c_k^α is independent of \mathbf{p}^α (which it is because of the exclusion of the $\beta = \alpha$ term in the payoff to α). If it were not, then the nonlinear dependence of P^α on \mathbf{p}^α would have invalidated the argument (as is the case in PRD, where the analogous quantity $\sum_{k,j} x_k a_{kj} x_j$ is quadratic in the x_i , and corners are not the generic attractors).

This argument also sheds some light on why heteroclinic cycles could be attractors. The point is that c_k^α are not constants, but depend upon the strategy profiles of agents other than α . If the change in these profiles causes some other c_k^α (for some $k = l'$, different from l) to overtake c_l^α , then from that time onwards, agent α will have to change track and move towards pure strategy l' rather than l .

In particular the above theorems mean that the IEP is always unstable in GRD.

4.3. COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOUR

We have seen above that the GRD flows to corners generically. The next step is to determine *which* corners the dynamics flows to. For the moment we restrict ourselves to FDCEPs. Characterizing an FDCEP by its \mathbf{n} vector (described in the previous section), we have the following result:

Theorem 4: Let \mathbf{n} and \mathbf{n}' be any two asymptotically stable FDCEPs with $N \geq s$. If condition **A1** holds then all components of $\mathbf{n} - \mathbf{n}'$ are bounded by a function of the payoff matrix A alone (and not of N). Further,

$$\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{n_i}{N} = x_i.$$

Thus, out of a large number (of order N^{s-1}) of FDCEPs all of which are equilibria for GRD, only a few are stable. Further, even though the agents are acting individually and selfishly and going to corners (specializing), the system as a whole retains a memory of the unique interior equilibrium point (which is guaranteed to exist under the conditions of the above theorem) and tunes the ratios n_i/N such that they are close to the IEP x_i values.

One can give a physical or “economic” interpretation of this collective behaviour. A stable equilibrium is by theorem 2 a strict Nash equilibrium. Thus it cannot be advantageous for any agent to switch her pure strategy unilaterally. This means that all agents must receive more or less the same payoff. More precisely, since a switch of strategy by a single agent causes changes of $O(1)$ in the payoffs to other agents, at a strict Nash equilibrium it must be the case that differences of payoffs among agents could not be larger than $O(1)$, since otherwise it would be possible for some agent to make an advantageous switch without affecting others. Thus stability is achieved only at those equilibria at which differences in payoff among agents are a very small fraction of the total payoff to any agent, which is $O(N)$. This requirement of “near-equality” of payoffs narrows down the set of stable equilibria considerably. As to why the ratio n_i/N gets tuned to be close to the IEP, we remark that in both PRD and GRD, the IEP is characterized by exactly equal payoffs to all strategies.

The above remarks also help explain some of our numerical results. When we increased the number of agents from 5 to 10, we found that all cases converged to corners. This is because as N increases, the ratios n_i/N can reproduce the x_i values corresponding to IEP more accurately and thereby achieve the near-equality of payoffs required for the existence of a strict Nash equilibrium.

4.4. DIVERSITY AND SELF-ORGANIZATION

We have seen above that among the FDCEPs, only a very small subset can be asymptotically stable. Now we consider non-FDCEPs. It could happen that along

with an FDCEP, some non-FDCEPs are also stable. In that case, if the community starts in the basin of attraction of a non-FDCEP, it would eventually lose its diversity. We would like to eliminate such attractors of the dynamics. It turns out that this can be achieved by imposing certain inequalities on the payoff matrix elements. Consider the following condition:

A2: The payoff matrix is diagonally subdominant, i.e., $a_{ii} < a_{ji} \forall j \neq i$.

Theorem 5: For $s = 2$, if **A2** holds, then all non-FDCEPs are unstable for $N \geq 2$. For $s = 3$, if **A1**, **A2** hold, then there exists a positive number N_0 depending on A , such that all non-FDCEPs are unstable for $N > N_0$.

The condition **A2** means that each pure strategy gives more payoff to other strategies than itself, clearly a tendency that would support diversity. It is interesting that the model also has the desirable feature that larger communities favour diversity.

It will be useful to have conditions for higher s also which make all the non-FDCEPs unstable. Partial results in this direction are contained in [6]. We expect that for higher s the condition of sufficiently large N and further inequalities on the payoff matrix elements would ensure the instability of non-FDCEP.

We now discuss the behaviour of the system when such conditions hold. Notice that since these conditions are inequalities on the payoff matrix elements (and not equalities), the behaviour of the system is structurally stable or generic, i.e., is not destroyed by a small perturbation of the parameters. From the evidence presented in section 5.2, the system is expected to go to a corner with generic initial conditions. By theorem 5 (and its generalizations to higher s), this corner cannot be a non-FDCEP. Hence it must be an FDCEP. But then theorem 4 applies and tells us that it must be a very specific corner. At this corner the number of agents n_i pursuing the pure strategy i is fine tuned to a value close to Nx_i with x_i determined by the payoff matrix via Theorem 1, and all agents receive the same $O(N)$ payoff upto differences of $O(1)$. The final state is fine-tuned but robust in that it arises without fine-tuning the parameters or the initial state. In this sense (of spontaneous dynamical fine-tuning) the system exhibits self-organization, albeit without any obvious critical behaviour. Furthermore, this self organization is of the kind that we were originally seeking, namely, in which the community exhibits individual specialization and global diversity.

4.5. INNOVATIONS

So far we have considered strategy spaces of a fixed size s . However, the growth of diversity in the systems mentioned in the introduction has to do with the appearance of new strategies and disappearance of some old strategies. We now discuss how the above considerations of the instability of non-FDCEPs are relevant for the generation of innovations. As an example consider a community of N agents which has initially only two strategies and a payoff matrix A satisfying condition **A2**. Then all non-FDCEPs are unstable and only those FDCEPs with $\mathbf{n} = (n_1, n_2)$ such that the ratios n_i/N close to x_i of the IEP are stable. Let us assume that the system has settled into such a state. Now, assume that a new, third strategy arises which enlarges the 2×2 matrix A into a 3×3 matrix A' that contains A as a submatrix. The third row and column of A' represent the relationship of the new strategy with respect to the old – how much payoff it gives to them and receives from them. At the time

this strategy arises, the system is in the state $(n_1, n_2, 0)$ since the third strategy (being new) is as yet unpopulated. Note that this state is a non-FDCEP for $s = 3$. Now if A' is such that it satisfies the conditions **A1**, **A2** in Theorem 5, and N is sufficiently large, then the above state is unstable. Therefore, any small perturbation in which the agents start exploring the new strategy ever so slightly will destroy the old state and take the system to a new stable state which must be an FDCEP with 3 strategies. By Theorem 4 this state will be (n'_1, n'_2, n'_3) with

$$\frac{1}{N}(n'_1, n'_2, n'_3) \approx (x'_1, x'_2, x'_3)$$

where x'_i are the components of the IEP corresponding to the payoff matrix A' and are all non-zero since A' satisfies **A1**. Thus the innovation has destabilized the previous state of the system and brought it to a new state where a finite fraction of the population has adopted strategy 3. In such a case, we say that the innovation has been “accepted” by the community. Note that the only requirements for this to happen is that the elements of the new row and column in the payoff matrix satisfy certain inequalities with respect to the existing matrix elements (contained in the conditions **A1**, **A2** to be satisfied by A') and that the community be sufficiently large. This tells us what properties a new strategy should have *in the context of already existing activities* in order for it to be “accepted” by the community. Thus the model suggests a natural mechanism for the emergence of context dependent innovations in the community.

5. Conclusions

To summarize, Generalized Replicator Dynamics, eq. (1), is a nonlinear dynamical model of learning for a community of N mutually interacting agents with the following features:

1. Each agent is selfish and exhibits bounded rationality.
2. This is a non-cooperative game and there is no global organizing agency at work. It is in general a non-hamiltonian system.
3. Specialization of individual agents to pure strategies is a generic outcome of the dynamics.
4. Under certain generic conditions on the payoff matrix parameters the agents exhibit a collective behaviour, and for sufficiently large N , the community exhibits diversity and self-organization.
5. A ‘good’ innovation (one that satisfies conditions **A1**, **A2**, etc., with respect to the existing strategies) makes the society unstable and evolve until the innovation is accepted.

It is noteworthy that in this dynamical system, order is generated at large N (unlike the systems where increasing the number of degrees of freedom makes the system less orderly, in some sense). This order is not the usual statistical mechanical kind of order, the order of appropriately defined macroscopic variables, but an order in the original dynamical variables themselves. However, in another sense, this order is also statistical since we do not know which pure strategy an individual agent follows. We only know about the fraction of agents pursuing a given strategy.

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Email addresses:

borkar@csa.iisc.ernet.in, jain@cts.iisc.ernet.in, rangaraj@math.iisc.ernet.in

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